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Abstract 
 Choice models in marketing and economics are generally derived without specifying the 
underlying cognitive process of decision making.  This approach has been successfully used to 
predict choice behavior.  However, it has not much to say about such aspects of decision making 
as deliberation, attention, conflict, and cognitive limitations and how these influence choices.  In 
contrast, sequential sampling models developed in cognitive psychology explain observed 
choices based on assumptions about cognitive processes that return the observed choice as the 
terminal state.  We illustrate three advantages of this perspective.  First, making explicit 
assumptions about underlying cognitive processes results in measures of deliberation, attention, 
conflict, and cognitive limitation.  Second, the mathematical representations of underlying 
cognitive processes imply well documented departures from Luce’s Choice Axiom such as the 
similarity, compromise, and attraction effects.  Third, the process perspective predicts response 
time and thus allows for inference based on observed choices and response times.  Finally, we 
briefly discuss the relationship between these cognitive models and rules for statistically optimal 
decisions in sequential designs. 
 
Keywords: Luce's Axiom;  Choice Models;  Diffusion Models;  Race Models;  Human 
Information Processing;  Response Time;  Optimal Decision Making;  Likelihood 
Based Inference 
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Sequential Sampling Models of Choice:  Some Recent Advances 
 
1. Introduction 
Choice models in marketing and economics are usually derived using a constrained 
maximization framework.  The decision maker is assumed to choose the option that maximizes 
utility subject to a budget constraint.  Observed departures from systematic behavior as implied 
by a particular utility function are attributed to aspects of utility that cannot be observed by the 
analyst.  This viewpoint is generally not distinguishable from the assumption that some aspect of 
decision making is truly random.  While the prevalent constrained maximization framework 
could in principle be extended to accommodate any number and type of constraints such as 
constraints related to attention, cognitive capacity, the time to make the decision, etc. such an 
extension has proven to be difficult (see Gilbride & Allenby 2006 for an example that derives 
optimal screening rules).  Consequently, the prevailing choice models used in marketing and 
economics, such as the logit and the probit model, are consistent with instantaneous utility 
maximization, i.e. they abstract away from the cognitive processes that lead to the identification 
of the alternative chosen from a set. 
Adamovicz et al. (this volume) provide a general discussion of ways to improve on 
currently used choice models.  In this paper, we focus on sequential sampling models derived 
from primitive assumptions about the cognitive processes that result in a choice.  The basic idea 
is that the observed choice corresponds to the terminal state of a process that started in some 
state and evolved over a period of time.  This is obviously closer to reality than is instantaneous 
utility maximization.  However, given that the cognitive process itself is unobservable, the 
crucial question is whether the description of the underlying cognitive process leads to different 
inferences in comparison to standard models.  In a sense, we are therefore documenting how 
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integrating with respect to the realization of a cognitive process results in predictions that are 
more in line with the observed data than integrating with respect to the commonly assumed 
distributions for the error term in random utility models. 
We do not claim that a process perspective is necessary to achieve these results.  In 
theory, every process corresponds to some (non-standard) error distribution.  We also do not 
claim that a process perspective is fundamentally at odds with a random utility framework since 
one may choose to refer to realizations of the process as the random components of utility and to 
non-stochastic elements in the process description as the 'deterministic' component of utility.  
However, we hope to illustrate that a process perspective is a natural starting point for the 
construction of choice models that meaningfully extend the set of models currently in use.  We 
also show how a process perspective leads to measures for other aspects of choice such as 
response time, diligence, amount of conflict and processing capacity.  Such measures are useful 
for applications that go beyond the mere prediction of choice outcomes.  Finally, we will 
introduce a very recent stream of research that compares the performance implications of process 
models to statistically optimal decisions derived from sequential probability ratio testing (Bogacz 
et al. 2006).  This line of research is interesting because it elevates (some) process models 
beyond the status of useful descriptions by motivating their architecture from optimal decision 
making under time constraints given noisy input information. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  In Section 2 we introduce sequential 
sampling models that motivate choice through latent (cognitive) accumulation processes and 
briefly review their history.  Section 3 discusses selected applications. Section 4 illustrates some 
challenges for estimation and Section 5 concludes with a discussion and directions for future 
research. 
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2. Sequential Sampling Models 
Sequential sampling models (e.g. Townsend & Ashby 1983) were originally developed in 
the context of simple perceptual identification tasks that require only low levels of cognition.  
The idea is that, after the onset of a stimulus, the decision maker sequentially extracts and 
accumulates information from the stimulus and/or its mental representation to determine the 
nature of the stimulus.  In the simplest task, the decision maker has to determine if a stimulus is 
present or not.  Another popular task consists of pairs of letters where the decision maker has to 
identify pairs of same or different letters.  In this context, the decision maker’s perceptual and 
cognitive system is summarized by a rate of information accumulation and a decision criterion 
that specifies the amount of information required before a response occurs.  Together the 
accumulation rate and the decision criterion determine response probabilities and response times. 
Race models, or counter and accumulator models, assume that evidence in favor of the 
available options is accumulated in separate stores (e.g., LaBerge 1962, Vickers 1970).  The 
accumulation process stops whenever any of the stores first accumulates a prespecified amount 
of evidence, and the corresponding choice is made.  The time at which this happens corresponds 
to the response time.  In applications, race models often build on the assumption that evidence 
accrues to the stores in the form of discrete 'hits' that follow independent Poisson processes. 
Diffusion models, or the related random walk models, assume that relative evidence is 
accumulated over time (e.g., Ashby 1983, Stone 1960).  In the special case of two alternatives, 
relative evidence is defined as the evidence difference or the natural log of the ratio.  With two 
alternatives, both definitions result in a scalar that is assumed to evolve according to a 
continuous stochastic process.  Evidence for one alternative is therefore simultaneously evidence 
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against the other alternative.  Relative evidence has to exceed / fall below prespecified 
boundaries for a response to occur.  The particular boundary reached first determines the 
response, and the time at which the boundary is reached, the response time.  Stochastic processes 
that have been studied in some detail in this context are the Wiener and the Orenstein-Uhlenbeck 
process (Diederich & Busemeyer 2003, Smith 2000).  In practice it is common to approximate 
the continuous time stochastic processes by discrete time Markov chains (cf. Smith 2000). 
Both race and diffusion models have successfully been applied to perceptual 
identification tasks.  In more recent work they have been generalized to preferential choice 
among multi-attribute alternatives providing explanations for empirically well documented 
violations of Luce’s choice axiom (see Rieskamp et al. 2006 for a recent overview). 
Luce’s choice axiom implies independence from irrelevant alternatives and regularity.  
Independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) requires that ratios of choice probabilities for 
fixed alternatives are constant across varying choice sets.  A weaker version of IIA, order 
independence, only requires the order of probabilities to be constant across varying choice sets 
(Tversky 1972b).  Regularity requires that adding alternatives to a set always translates into 
weakly smaller probabilities of choosing any of the original options. 
The similarity and the compromise effects both violate IIA.  The attraction effect (Huber, 
Payne & Puto 1982, Huber & Puto 1983) refutes regularity.  The similarity effect (Tversky 
1972a), in the limit, refers to the situation where the addition of another alternative to a set 
decreases the probability of choosing alternatives perceived to be identical but leaves choice 
probabilities of other alternatives unchanged.  The compromise effect (Simonson 1989, Tversky 
& Simonson 1993) describes the observation that a compromise, alternative C is most likely 
chosen from the set {A, B, C}, even though the decision maker does not show a preference for C 
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in either of the binary choices between {A, C} and {B, C}.  The compromise option C is 
characterized by attribute levels that fall in between the attribute values of options A and B, 
hence the name.  Finally, the attraction effect describes the observation that adding an 
asymmetrically dominated alternative to a set of two alternatives increases the choice probability 
of the now respectively dominant alternative. 
Busemeyer & Townsend (1993) introduced decision field theory (DFT) as a framework 
for process based modeling of choice.  DFT is built on the idea that relative evidence has to 
exceed / fall below prespecified boundaries for a choice to occur.  Thus, it can be viewed as an 
instance of a diffusion model.  Roe et al. (2001) generalized the model to preferential choices 
among multi-attribute alternatives.  DFT contains classic random utility theory as a special case 
and provides a unifying framework for explaining the described violations of Luce’s choice 
axiom. 
DFT assumes that the decision maker’s attention fluctuates stochastically between the 
various attributes.  At any given moment, a single attribute is considered and options with similar 
attribute values accumulate similar amounts of evidence.  Plotting accumulated evidence against 
time, the accumulation paths of similar options thus exhibit positive correlation.  Similar 
alternatives therefore tend toward meeting the decision criterion simultaneously, creating the 
similarity effect. 
DFT further assumes that the accumulated evidence in favor of alternatives is subject to 
decay and competition.  Without any processing input, evidence in favor of alternatives 
gradually decays to a state of indifference.  Competition is incorporated in the model via 
inhibitory links between options that imply that increasing evidence for one option causes 
evidence for other options connected via inhibitory links to it to decrease over time.  The 
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parameters quantifying the strength of competitive inhibition are a function of the distance 
between alternatives in the attribute space.  Close alternatives inhibit each other more strongly 
than do distant alternatives.   
The inhibitory links produce both the compromise and attraction effects.  The inhibitory 
connection between the compromise option ‘in the middle’ and each of the extreme options is 
stronger than that between the extreme options.  This asymmetry induces positive correlation 
between the relative evaluations of the extreme options and thus makes the choice of the 
compromise option more likely (cf. Kivetz et al. 2004, Usher & McClelland 2004).   
In case of the attraction effect, the dominated alternative accumulates negative relative 
evidence, which through the inhibitory, negative link translates into a boost for the similar, but 
dominating option.  Moreover, the dynamics of decision field theory link the size of these effects 
to the amount of time spent with the decision.  The amount of time invested is in turn a function 
of the accuracy goal of the decision maker.  For instance, the effect of inhibition accumulates 
over time, with the implication that the attraction effect only occurs in well deliberated choices. 
DFT and its various extensions (see Section 3) provide a rich framework for modeling 
preferential choice among multi-attribute alternatives.  However, specification issues and 
computational challenges must be addressed for likelihood based inference to become practically 
feasible with this framework (see Section 4).  This may be one reason why early applications of 
sequential sampling models in marketing, discussed in the following section, rely on Poisson 
race models and not decision field theory. 
 
3. Selected Applications in Psychology and Marketing 
Applications of Race models in marketing 
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Otter et al. (forthcoming) explored the idea that respondent diligence can be distinguished 
from respondents’ tastes using a Poisson race model applied to conjoint data.  In the Poisson race 
model, evidence in favor of an alternative is assumed to accrue according to a Poisson process of 
discrete units that are called ‘hits’.  The decision maker tracks the number of hits in favor of each 
alternative on specific counters.  As soon as any one counter reaches its threshold, the 
corresponding alternative is chosen and the race terminates.  The Poisson race model contains 
the multinomial logit model as a special case with a threshold equal to one.  
Respondent diligence is measured by the threshold parameter.  Thresholds larger than 
one give rise to choice probabilities that structurally depart from IIA such that the chances of 
choosing bad alternatives decrease disproportionally (see Ruan 2007 for a detailed mathematical 
analysis).  And, it can be shown that, given the same amount of data, a larger threshold translates 
into more likelihood information about taste parameters or part-worths than does a smaller 
threshold.  
The Poisson race model implies a joint density for choices and response times.  Otter et 
al. found that the integration of response times requires the modeling of constrained (processing) 
capacity and heterogeneous processing speeds that change over the course of the task as a 
function of process priming.  Their empirical results support endogeneity of response times as 
implied by the model.  Quick response times point to easy decisions where at least one of the 
alternatives is outstanding, and slow response times point to hard decisions where the 
alternatives are less or equally attractive.  The integration of response times marginally improves 
predictions.  
Ruan et al. (forthcoming) introduced dependence between the alternative specific Poisson 
counters to model choices among pairs of credit cards in a conjoint experiment.  The statistical 
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model is motivated from independent psychological processes underlying the valuation of 
individual attribute levels that have stochastic components.  Realized valuations of attribute 
levels are integrated deterministically to the overall evidence in favor of a particular alternative.  
The alternative that first accrues an amount of evidence equal to the threshold required for a 
decision is chosen.  The model thus combines elements of attribute- and alternative-based 
decision making strategies. 
Dependence between alternative specific attribute counters is a direct consequence of 
shared realizations of stochastic valuations of attribute levels.  Two alternatives that are close in 
the space set up by the attributes thus not only achieve similar expected overall evaluations but 
each pair of realized overall evaluations is similar.  For two identical alternatives, any pair of 
realized overall evaluations is identical.  
Ruan et al. illustrate how their model naturally handles attribute based dominance as a 
special case of similarity.  Attribute based dominance occurs if one alternative in a set is strictly 
better than another on at least one attribute and not worse on all other attributes.  In their model, 
two alternatives always share the realized valuation of worse attribute levels.  Thus, the race 
between the dominating and the dominated alternative can only end with the dominating 
alternative winning or in a tie.  They develop a tie-breaking rule that puts positive probability on 
choosing the dominated alternative to accommodate errors and / or satisficing behavior.  
While the special case of dominance could be addressed in a variety of ways, Ruan et al. 
found that their model improves predictions considerably over the standard logit formulation, 
even in the case where the design does not feature dominance relationships.  It seems that their 
model, which is consistent with psychological processes at the attribute evaluation level and thus 
exhibits similarity effects, is one step closer to a structural representation of the choice process. 
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Huang and Hutchinson (forthcoming) applied a version of the Poisson race model to 
jointly model three dependent variables, namely choices, reaction times and confidence ratings in 
a belief verification task.  They show that the joint information contained in the three dependent 
variables as summarized by the model parameters improves predictions of a theoretically related 
dependent variable (i.e., attitudes) compared to direct use of choices, reaction times or 
confidence ratings.  However, they also report that, for their data, reactions times add very little 
incremental information beyond what is contained in choices and confidence ratings, despite the 
fact that reaction times are affected by their experimental manipulations and are reasonably well-
predicted by the Poisson race model.  The substantive goal of their research was to compare 
belief verification to retrospective thought-listing as a measure of cognitive responses to 
persuasive communications.  The Poisson model was used to detect the effects of specific 
thoughts during exposure to an advertisement on subsequent beliefs about the advertised product.  
Their experiments illustrate the effectiveness of estimated model parameters in predicting 
consumers’ attitudes and the fact that these model-based measures can outperform traditional 
thought-listing when people are unwilling or unable to report certain thoughts. 
 
Applications and Extensions of Decision Field Theory 
Diederich (1997) extended DFT to multi-attribute decision field theory (MDFT).  MDTF 
assumes that the preference process (technically, the diffusion process) has a specific input 
valence for each attribute.  At any particular time during deliberation the decision maker’s 
attention process may be operating on the process for one attribute and, during the next moment, 
attention either continues to operate on the process for that attribute or attention switches to 
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operate on the process for another attribute.  Thus, MDTF handles serial processing of attributes 
as a special, degenerate case of state-dependent attention switching (cf. Roe et al. 2001). 
MDFT accounts for several empirical findings in the context of decision making under 
time pressure.  For instance, changes in the choice probabilities and more generally preference 
orders as a function of time constraints are viewed as the result of changes in the decision 
criterion, i.e. the amount of relative evidence necessary for a choice to occur.  Under time 
pressure, the decision maker has to base the decision on less relative evidence that is likely 
produced before all attributes are considered or individual attributes can be reconsidered (for 
details see Diederich 2003a).   
Diederich (2003b) showed how MDFT can be used to measure the amount of conflict 
induced by the desirability/undesirability of attribute values and the variability of outcomes.  
Diederich & Busemeyer (1999) related violations of stochastic dominance to conflict caused by 
negatively correlated payoffs.  MDFT predicts this violation.  The decision maker’s attention 
changes from moment to moment, switching back and forth from one uncertain state to another 
during deliberation.  While attending momentarily to a particular state, the decision maker 
compares consequences produced by each action under that state.  These momentary 
comparisons are integrated over time to form an integrated preference for each action.  When the 
payoffs are negatively correlated, the comparisons change their sign back and forth from positive 
to negative as attention fluctuates, producing up-and-down vacillations in preference that lead to 
violations of stochastic dominance.  When payoffs are positively correlated, the comparison 
always produces a positive (or zero) increment favoring Action A over Action B, independent of 
the state to which the decision maker attends.  In this case, preference for the dominant action 
always increases over time, so that stochastic dominance is satisfied. 
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Johnson & Busemeyer (2005, 2007) applied the DFT framework to tasks with alternative 
response types, as well as to cognitive subprocesses assumed to drive discrete choice.  First, they 
developed a model that provides a way of mapping a single option onto a numeric value, which 
takes the form of a series of comparisons using the binary DFT choice model.  Second, they 
formalized the decision weighting (e.g., probability weighting) process as one of sequential 
sampling that determines the sequence of attentional foci in MDFT. 
The pricing extension to DFT (Johnson & Busemeyer, 2005) predicts the buying price, 
selling price, and certainty equivalent for an option, in addition to choice probabilities when the 
option is paired against another.  It predicts the empirically documented reversals between 
choices and prices as well as reversals between buying and selling prices.  The model assumes 
that a price is generated for an option by conducting a series of implicit comparisons between the 
option and candidate response prices until a suitable price is identified.  That is, a set of 
candidate prices is defined, as is a probability distribution over this set to determine which price 
is considered first. 
The first price considered is then compared to the option using the DFT choice process.  
If the candidate price is preferred, the price is decremented to produce the next candidate price, 
whereas if the option is preferred, the price is incremented to produce the next candidate price.  
With some probability, the comparison results in an indifference response.  This indifference 
response occurs with a probability governed by an exit rate parameter, whenever the diffusion 
process is in the neutral or zero state.  With this specification, the model predicts an entire 
distribution of response prices for any given option.  The difference between pricing types 
(buying vs. selling), for instance, is captured by differences in the initial distribution – lower 
prices tend to be considered first for buying situations to minimize expenditure; higher prices are 
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more likely considered first for selling prices to maximize revenue.  Other factors that could be 
modeled through the initial price distribution are reference prices or anchors set by competitive 
prices. 
 
4. Inference 
Challenges for likelihood-based inference 
The practical feasibility of likelihood based inference is almost required for models to be 
useful in marketing because of data structures that necessitate the use of hierarchical models and 
the need to evaluate (managerial) loss functions for decision making.  Likelihood based inference 
is relatively straightforward for the Poisson race models discussed in this paper, as the latent 
Poisson processes are assumed to be time homogenous with independent increments (across 
time) after possibly rescaling time.  Thus, the unobserved hits can be integrated out analytically 
to yield closed form expressions for both the marginal likelihood of choices and the joint 
likelihood of choices, response times, and confidence. 
The situation seems to be more complicated with DFT and its generalizations.  A central 
concept of DFT is that attention fluctuates momentarily between attributes (Busemeyer & 
Townsend 1993).  These fluctuations give rise to correlated preferences such that the strength of 
the correlation between two alternatives is a function of their distance in the attribute space.  
Another central concept is decay in the accumulated preferences coupled with negative feedback, 
i.e. inhibition between alternative specific preference stores (Roe et al. 2001).  The inhibitory 
strength is again proportional to how similar or close two alternatives are in the attribute space.  
Inhibition between alternatives is essential to produce the attraction and the compromise effect.  
However, the joint identification status of the probability law governing attention fluctuation, of 
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attribute weights, and inhibition parameters has yet to be investigated in detail.  The same holds 
for the joint identification of attribute weights and Diederich’s (1997) generalizations of the 
probability law governing attention fluctuation in the absence of inhibition.  
The joint density of choices and response times in decision field theory is the solution to 
a system of stochastic differential equations describing an, in the multi-alternative case vector-
valued, inhomogenous diffusion process.  Diederich & Busemeyer (2003) show how to compute 
marginal, conditional choice probabilities and response time distributions accurately using a 
discrete time Markov approximation (cf. Smith 2000).  Transition probabilities in the discrete 
representation of the state space are derived from the parameters of the underlying continuous 
process; straightforward matrix algebra then yields marginal, conditional choice probabilities and 
response time distributions.  However, with more than three alternatives to choose from, an 
explicit approximation to the state space becomes tedious, and suitable algorithms have yet to be 
developed.  A potential alternative to the explicit representation of the state space is to augment 
the unobserved accumulation paths in the context of simulation based Bayesian inference via 
MCMC (Tanner & Wong 1987). 
 
Model free inference about basic architectural features and capacity 
The topic of model identification has received considerable attention in mathematical 
psychology under the title ‘model mimicry’.  It has been shown that models with radically 
different assumptions about the processing architecture such as parallel versus serial processing 
are not easily distinguished empirically (Townsend 1972, Townsend & Ashby 1983). 
However, strong methods for assessing such strategic mechanisms in elementary 
cognitive action have been worked out in psychology and cognitive science (e.g., Townsend & 
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Ashby 1983, Townsend & Wenger 2004, Schweickert & Townsend 1989):  1. Architecture 
(parallel vs. serial processing vs. more complex networks).  2. Work-load capacity (e.g., how 
does performance change as a function of the number of attributes or when the number of 
attribute levels is increased?).  3. Decisional stopping rules (e.g., when should or does a process 
cease during information processing or attribute weighting?).  4. Stochastic independence vs. 
negative or positive dependence among attributes or choice objects.  These methodologies are 
theory driven and specified in rigorous mathematical form. 
A particularly successful example of these methodologies is the Double Factorial 
Paradigm, which delivers direct identification of items (1) through (3) and indirect evidence of 
(4).  Ashby & Townsend (1986) developed other experimental designs which allow direct 
adjudication of the independence issue.  An especially provocative finding using this paradigm is 
its ability to uncover not only the typical limited capacity nature of human information 
processing but situations involving perceptual unification (aka configural or Gestalt processing) 
where efficiency actually improves with increased workload (e.g., Townsend & Nozawa, 1995).   
 
5. Discussion and Future Research 
It seems clear to the authors that an individual's choices must be based on underlying 
cognitive processes.  Modeling in marketing, however, has traditionally taken a top-down 
approach.  Thus, the recognition of inconsistency of an individual's choices has led from 
deterministic utility to Luce's choice axiom and random utility; the recognition of the similarity 
effect has led from the multinomial logit model to the nested multinomial logit model; the 
inability of these models to predict choices in settings of massive multiplicity has led to the 
development of the elimination by aspects model; etc.  These models have produced immense 
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improvements in our understanding of choice data and in our ability to extract useful information 
about individual and aggregated preferences.   
In contrast, the tradition of studying processes in psychology has been to focus on a 
bottom-up approach.  Experiments in relatively simple settings have been carefully designed and 
conducted with the goal of elucidating features of the processes that underlie decision making.  
Plausible models for the processes have been proposed and compared to the experimental 
evidence.  The match between the models and the experimental evidence is striking, suggesting 
that, in these settings, the posited processes provide a good description of the decision making 
process.   
The research agenda that we have focused on is to take the basic processes and to extend 
them from relatively simple choice tasks to the complex choice tasks faced in marketing.  The 
potential gains from such extensions are twofold:  Better analysis of data sets, especially when it 
comes to transferring results from data collected in one situation to another context, and a better 
understanding of choice processes.  This leads to several directions for research, some of which 
we have already begun to explore (Table 1). 
First, experimental work aimed at clarifying basic features of typical choices encountered 
in marketing, such as serial versus parallel processing, the effect of workload on performance, 
the decisional stopping rules used, etc. will provide much needed guidance for modeling.  The 
kinds of experiments we envision are based on methodologies such as the double factorial 
paradigm (e.g. Townsend & Nozawa 1995).  The envisioned experiments are not aimed at 
simply identifying significant departures from standard models but translate into general 
structural requirements for better models in a particular but not singular context. 
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Choice problems in Marketing 
Experimental work Modeling 
Model free evidence 
- serial / parallel processing 
- processing capacity 
- decisional stopping rules 
- dependence structures 
Sequential sampling models 
- model choices and other observables 
such as response time jointly 
- model dependence among 
accumulation processes implied by 
particular processing styles (e.g. 
alternative based versus attribute 
based) 
- explore connections to established 
choice models through reduced form 
representations / approximations 
- formally extend the micro economic 
constrained maximization framework 
to include processing aspects 
- develop practical algorithms and user 
friendly software 
Table 1  Research issues 
 
Second, sequential sampling models imply both choice probabilities and a distribution on 
time until a decision is made.  This response time distribution and the choice are dependent, and 
this dependence implies that there is information in response time about an individual's 
preferences.  This information should be collected as part of the choice experiment (and often is 
as a by product), and it should be used in the analysis.   
Third, sequential sampling models can be extended to allow for dependence in the 
information accumulated toward particular choices.  The creation of models that capture this 
dependence implied by an experimental, qualitative understanding of the choice process (e.g. 
serial processing of attributes as in Diederich 1997) in a structured fashion will make the models 
more realistic and should result in better choice analysis.   
Fourth, the relationship between current top-down models and sequential sampling 
models needs to be better described.  Understanding this relationship will suggest better top-
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down approximations to sequential sampling models which may be easier to implement for 
practical analysis.   
Fifth, a recurring theme of behavioral work is the appearance in nature of decision-
making strategies which are optimal, or nearly optimal, subject to a set of constraints.  A very 
recent stream of research investigates the optimality of some of the sequential sampling models 
in a constrained maximization framework (Bogacz et al. 2006, McMillen and Holmes 2005).  
Constrained maximization here refers to the question of what decision rules will lead to decisions 
with a given probability of error in minimal time or, nearly equivalently, what decision rule 
minimizes the amount of error given a fixed time.  This work establishes (some) sequential 
sampling models not only as rich, quantitative descriptions of choice but as amenable to 
economic analysis.  
Sixth, there is a need for software which can fit the process-based models or close 
approximations to them.  The software would need to be efficient so that the models can be fit 
quickly, it needs to be able to handle data sets of realistic size and complexity, and it needs to be 
robust to handle vagaries of the data.  This sort of software would facilitate not only analysis, but 
also design of the experiments used to collect the data.   
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